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	i.	Until recently, the standard views about causality were driven by the Humean dogma that ignoring  expectations and other psychological factors, causal relations boil down to some sort of regularity among actual and possible occurrences of things like the cause and things like the effect.  Hume himself thought that actual occurrences of things like the cause must always be followed by actual occurrences of the effect under similar circumstances.(*cite) Analytically minded 20th century Humeans believed causal explanations require the derivation of canonically worded descriptions of the effect or the probability of its occurrence from canonical descriptions of initial conditions and universally applicable, exceptionless scientific laws whose modal status  makes them suitable for the derivation of counterfactual claims. .(*Hempel). The apparent scarcity of real world scientific causal processes which satisfy stringent regularity conditions led many latter day Humeans to retreat to a more modest view.  They continue to think the things physicists explain are instances of laws (general relativity field equations and Schrodinger’s equation, for example) which describe exceptionless regularities.  But they think biologists, psychologists, sociologists, and others who work in special sciences must somehow make do with contingent, second rate generalizations which hold locally rather than universally, are prone to exceptions, and hold only to an approximation of the systems whose effects they explain.(*cites including Beatty and *Mitchell, Phil Sci,)  Latter day Humeans can’t explain how such low grade principles can deliver satisfactory explanations unless they can be reduced to genuine laws.  Their failure to provide detailed reductions leaves them with little to say about causal explanations in the special science.
   To make matters worse, there are reasons to doubt the truth and universal applicability of generalizations from physics which Humeans typically consider to be genuine laws of nature.(*Cartwright, Scriven, Woodward PSA 2000, etc. and *Earman (in conversation) on how hard it is to think that Relativity and Quantum Mechanics laws are both correct.)  Some Humeans say the problematic generalizations are true ceteris paribus.  This collapses into the triviality that explanatory laws are true whenever they are true unless the ceteris conditions can be specified in some detail.  But when they are spelled out, the things the laws are supposed to explain often turn out to occur under circumstances which fail to satisfy them.  When this happens, It is hard to see why the truth of the ceteris paribus laws should make any difference to the goodness of an explanation.  Humeans tend to think we want an explanations for things which puzzle us because we didn’t expect it to happen.  If so, it should satisfy our desire for an explanation to show that an effect is an instance of a regularity..(*Cite Hempel)  But then ceteris paribus laws can’t explain effects which occur in situation which fail to satisfy the ceteris paribus conditions.(*Cite Cartwright)​[1]​
   So many difficulties have plagued the Humean program that it would be perverse not to look for a happier account of causal explanation  The most promising alternatives to Humeanism are Mechanism (as developed by various permutations of Machamer, Darden, and Craver), and systematic dependence accounts of causality (SD) like Jim Woodward's.(*cite)  Both reject the Humean idea that causal explanations depend on laws as traditionally understood.  
   SD maintains a variant of the traditional idea that regularity is crucial to causality, but the  regularities it believes to be characteristic of causal processes differ from those of standard Humean accounts.  For one thing, they are counterfactual regularities which obtain among ideal interventions on factors belonging to the system which produces the effect to be explained, and the results which would ensue if the interventions occurred.  Furthermore, because the required regularities typically hold only for some interventions, the generalizations which describe them need not qualify as genuine Humean laws.  Mechanism is an even more drastic departure from Humeanism.  It maintains that a causal explanation must describe the system which produces the effect of interest by enumerating its components and what they do to contribute to the production of the effect.  Mechanists acknowledge that some mechanisms operate with great regularity, but they do not believe that the understanding we get from a causal explanation derives from its description of actual or counterfactual regularities. 
  Our view is that the Humean program has broken down, and that Mechanism offers a better account of causal explanation than SD.  After sketching these two accounts in a little more detail (§ii below) we look (in §iii) at some typical neuroscientific explanations.  They are of interest first, because they actually do appeal to some highly general principles (Nernst’s equation, Ohm’s law, the Goldman, Hodgkin, Katz Constant Field equation and the Mullins and Noda Steady State equation) which look, as much as anything in this area of neuroscience, like Humean laws.  But as we’ll see, they, and the uses to which they are put, are decidedly and illuminatingly non-Humean.  Secondly, the explanations we consider involve a number of somewhat more limited generalizations about what goes on, or what can be expected to go on in the neuron under specified conditions.  SD and Mechanism can be expected to tell significantly different stories about such generalizations.  We use them (in § iv) to highlight some important differences between these alternatives to Humeanism.  Finally, we set out some of our reasons for preferring Mechanism (§*) and conclude with some general remarks about activities.
	ii.	According to Machamer, Darden, and Craver (MDC), causal mechanisms consist of 
…entities and activities organized such that they are productive of…changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions.(MDC, p.3)​[2]​.

The finish or termination conditions are the effects explained by an account of the workings of the mechanisms which produce them.  For example, the electro-chemical mechanism by which the signal is transmitted includes such entities as cell membranes, vesicles, microtubules, molecules and ions. The startup conditions include ‘the relevant entities and their properties’ along with ‘various enabling conditions…such as the available energy, pH, and electrical charge distributions…’ including the relevant features and states of the neurons and some of the items in their immediate environment. (MDC, p.8, 11)  Ions repelling ions of similar charge, proteins bending into configurations involved in the passage of sodium ions through channels in the cell membrane, and the movements of these and other ions are among the activities by which the entities which belong to the mechanism contribute to the transmission of a neuronal signal. Reliable mechanisms (the neural signal transmission mechanism is an example) operate uniformly under normal conditions to produce their effects with a high degree of regularity.  An adequate account of a reliable mechanism and the conditions under which it operates should therefore enable us to understand the regularities exhibited by the workings of its parts, to predict what effects the mechanism will produce or fail to produce under specified conditions, and to retrodict facts about the mechanism from results it has already produced.  It should also enable us to predict the effects of changes in the mechanism or the conditions under which it operates.​[3]​  But not all effects are produced by reliable mechanisms.  Satisfactory mechanistic explanations can sometimes be given for effects resulting from mechanisms whose operations are too irregular to enable us to reliably predict their future performance, or to systematically explain why they sometimes fail to produce the effects they produce on other occasions.  For example, you can explain what gets a chain saw started even if it’s an old chain saw that starts infrequently and irregularly.  Thus Mechanists do not believe that actual or counterfactual regularities are necessary for the explanation of an effect.  Even for an effect produced by a highly reliable mechanism, to provide an explanation which renders the effect intelligible is to show how it is produced by entities and their activities rather than to describe the regularities instanced by its production, or to break them down into more elementary regularities exhibited by the operation of parts of the mechanism.(MDC p.22) ​[4]​  Accordingly, when generalizations do figure in explanations, Mechanism must provide an alternative to Humean and SD accounts of the roles they play.
   SD agrees with Mechanism that causal explanations make things understandable by describing the influences of causal factors, rather than by subsuming explananda under laws.  But SD and Mechanism have different understandings of the difference between a causally productive relation between the values of two things (events, etc.) X and Y, and a correlation which is coincidental, or due to a common cause rather than X’s causal influence on the value of Y.  (Here and throughout this paper we use the term ‘value’ broadly for qualitative as well as qualitative states, features, conditions, of a thing as well as for it’s presence or absence at a given time or place.)  According to Woodward the difference turns on whether there is an invariant counterfactual relation between changes in the value of Y and at least some ‘interventions on X with respect to Y’(*cite) For example, suppose values of X are amounts of diphtheria toxin in a patient’s throat, and values of Y are levels of inflammation of the lining of the throat.  If the toxin is causally productive of (not just accidentally related to) throat inflammation, it should be counterfactually the case that if ideal manipulations were performed to introduce different amounts of toxin into the throat, then (at least for quantities falling within a certain range) there would be an invariant relation between levels of inflammation and amounts of toxin. An intervention on X with respect to Y must change the value of X without exerting any influence on anything which could change the value of Y independently of the change in the value of X.  This disqualifies introducing the toxin by putting it on an instrument and vigorously scraping the throat lining.  That’s because vigorous scraping can inflame the throat independently of the toxin.  It is not required that the values of Y change in a regular way under all interventions on X.  Thus SD can allow that after the amount of toxin reaches a critical level, the throat will be incapable of further inflammation, and that toxin levels below a critical amount will not produce any observable inflammation.  What SD requires is that values of Y change in a regular way with interventions on X within a limited range.  (*Cite, e.g., (Woodward long PSA 2000 p.6.)  And to distinguish X exerting a causal influence on Y, from Y exerting a causal influence of X, Woodward requires rather that values of X should not change in a systematic way with interventions on Y with respect to X.
   One of Woodward's own examples features the acceleration of a block sliding down an inclined plane.  The magnitude of the acceleration varies with a net force, Fn, whose magnitude depends upon N, a force perpendicular to the motion of the block due to its weight, and a frictional force, Fk.  At the surface of the earth, N varies in a fairly regular way with mg, the product of the block’s mass (m) and the acceleration of a body in free fall at the surface of the earth (g), along with the cosign of ,  the angle of the incline, for a limited range of values of .  As long as certain features of the plane and its environment  stay the same (e.g., it isn’t greased or roughed up) the frictional force, Fk  varies in a regular way with mg cos  for a limited number of values of .  Thus
	1.1	 Fnet = mg sin  - mg cos , and
	1.2	the acceleration of the block (a) approximates to g sin  -g cos  as long as the inclined 
		plane is at the surface of the earth, and the earth maintains the same mass and radius.  An ideal intervention on m with respect to Fnet would be an operation which changes the mass of the block without changing , or any of the other factors which might independently change the value of the net force (e.g., without roughing up the plane, moving the inclined plane away from the earth, introducing wind resistance, etc.).  An ideal intervention on  with respect to Fnet would be an operation which changes the angle of incline without changing anything else which might independently affect the value of the net force.  An intervention on  with respect to a would be an operation which changes the angle of the incline without changing anything else which could independently affect the acceleration of the block.  Ignoring niceties, to perform an ideal intervention on X (e.g., m or ) with respect to Y (e.g., Fnet, or a), one must change X in such a way that nothing which could independently affect Y changes except as a result of the change in X.  As said, Woodward thinks it is characteristic of causal interactions that if X exerts a causal influence on Y, the relation between them is ‘invariant’ for interventions on X within a limited range of values of X.  Equations 1.1 and 1.2 describe invariances in the relations between some values of m and Fnet, between  and a, and so on.  Since these equations do not hold under all background conditions or for all values of  or m​[5]​ they are not Humean laws.  As said, they describe counterfactual regularities like those which obtain among ideal interventions which change angles of incline and accelerations, masses and net forces, etc. within a certain range under certain sorts of background conditions. 
   As Woodward observes, SD  is meant to articulate such intuitions as that
[i]f X causes Y, one can wiggle Y by wiggling X, while when one wiggles Y, X remains unchanged,

and 
[i] f X and Y are related only as effects of a common cause C, then neither changes when one intervenes and sets the value of the other, but both can be changed by manipulating C.( Hausman and Woodward 1999, p.533). 

Woodward believes such intuitions are so central to our understanding of causality that counterfactuals dealing with ideal interventions on X with respect to Y should be understood as incorporated ‘into the content of causal claims’.(Woodward 2000 p.11) 
   The disagreement between Mechanism and SD is made vivid by an argument of Woodward’s intended to show that the difference between a non-causal interaction involving X and Y, and an interaction in which X produces a change in Y, is not that ‘an interaction counts as [causally] productive…as long as it involves some activity’.​[6]​  If Alice takes birth control pills and fails to become pregnant, the pills’ active ingredients engage in all sorts of activities including dissolving, entering the bloodstream, forming chemical bonds, etc., regardless of whether Alice is a fertile woman and the pills play a causal role in preventing her pregnancy, or Alice is Alice Cooper​[7]​ to whose non-pregnancy they are causally irrelevant.  Typical birth control pills are fail safe devices containing chemicals which interfere with the release of eggs from the ovary, thicken the cervical mucus to hinder the movement of sperm, and render the lining of the uterus unsuitable for the implantation of fertilized eggs.  According to Mechanism these chemicals are causally relevant when they do things which interfere with the mechanisms by which eggs are produced, sperm moves through cervical mucous, and fertilized eggs are implanted in the lining of the uterus.  They are causally irrelevant in males because males have no egg production, uteri or cervical mucous for them to interfere with.  By contrast, Woodward thinks the pills are relevant to Alice’s non-pregnancy if her taking the pills is an instance of the kind of intervention which is counterfactually related in a regular way to the prevention of pregnancy.  They are irrelevant to Alice Cooper’s non-pregnancy ‘because even if…[he] had not taken them, he would have failed to become pregnant.’(Woodward [2000] p.11)  The Mechanist denies that the causal influence of the chemicals in the pill is to be explained in terms of, or depends upon counterfactual regularities.  We don’t know whether Woodward believes activities are always necessary to causation, or whether some things exert their causal influences by virtue of conditions, states, features, etc., which are not activities.  But to the extent that the activities of chemicals in the pill are causally significant, Woodward thinks their significance turns on, and is to be understood by appeal to, counterfactual regularities involving ideal interventions.  Woodward paraphrases Robert Weinberg’s account of the difference between describing and explaining a biological process to illustrate the motivation for his emphasis on counterfactual invariances among ideal interventions and their results..  
According to Weinberg, biology is now an explanatory [rather than a merely descriptive] science because we have discovered theories and experimental techniques that provide information about how to intervene in and manipulate biological systems.  Earlier biological theories...fail to provide such information, and for that reason are merely descriptive.  As Weinberg puts it, molecular biologists correctly think that “the invisible microscopic agents they study can explain at one essential level the complexity of life’ because by manipulating those agents it is now ‘possible to change critical elements of the biological blueprint at will’.(‘What is a mechanism?’ p. 10).

Judging from the paraphrase, Weinberg claims (and so would we) that in order to control a real system scientists need a causal theory which tells them about how to perform real world manipulations on the relevant causal factors.  What this suggests to Woodward is the significantly different idea that philosophers need to incorporate counterfactual conditionals concerning the effects of ideal interventions (recall that these are manipulations of a very special kind) into their accounts of causal explanation.  Mechanism grants the importance of causal knowledge to the control of a real system, but it denies that counterfactuals about the results of ideal interventions on X with respect to Y are part of the content of the claim that X exerts a causal influence on Y. 
	iii.	We turn now to our discussion of explanations which seem to involve Humean laws and  descriptions of counterfactual regularities among ideal interventions and their results.  Having described them, we will suggest Mechanism friendly alternative construals of them.  
   The membrane potential (Vm) of a segment of neuronal membrane is the difference between the electrical potential just outside and just inside of it.  The membrane potential of neurons at rest ranges, in different species of  organisms, between –40 and –90 millivolts (mV)--the minus sign indicating that the charge just inside the membrane is negative in comparison to the charge just outside.  Intra cellular electrical currents are generated and propagated (along an axon, for example) when sites along the membrane depolarize, i.e., when Vm becomes less negative. Action potentials occur when membrane depolarization reaches a critical threshold.  When the membrane depolarizes (when Vm becomes more negative and moves toward its resting level) they cease to occur; no further action potentials are propagated until the next depolarization.
   The facts to be explained have to do with resting state membrane potentials, and the propagation of action potentials.  The latter are currents which rapidly traverse the neuron without modification or diminution to excite or inhibit neuronal activity on the other side of a synapse. The explanations we will consider  depend upon the empirically well established fact that the effects of interest depend upon distributions and behaviors of charged ions, including Na+, K+ and Cl-, to be found in changing concentrations just inside and just outside the cell membrane.  In particular, it is generally agreed that the sign and magnitude of the membrane potential depends upon the cross membrane ratio of negatively to positively charged ions.  The leading idea of the explanations is that changes in membrane potential depend upon changes in these ratios due to transmembrane and intracellular ion flows.  
   The neuronal membrane is permeable to potassium, less permeable to sodium, and still less, but somewhat permeable to chlorine ions.  Accordingly, these ions tend to leak at different rates through the membrane down their concentration gradients; regardless of charge, they tend to move from regions of higher to regions of lower concentration.  They also tend to move down their electrical gradients: positively charged ions tend to move from more toward less positively charged locations; negative ions tend to move from more to less negatively charged locations.  The Nernst equation (said by one textbook to be so fundamental to our understanding of neuronal signaling that ‘if you learn only one equation in your study of neurobiology, the Nernst equation…is the one to learn’(Shepherd, p.91)) describes the equilibrium potential for a highly idealized, imaginary cell whose membrane is permeable only to ions of a single kind.  For any species of ion, X, the equilibrium potential (E​x) is the membrane potential required to offset the tendency of X ions to move across the membrane because of the difference between the concentration of X ions just outside the membrane [X]​out,  and their concentration [X]in just inside.  The equilibrium for any ion is proportional, not to the ratio of the concentrations on either side of the membrane, but to its natural log:
	2.	Nernst: EX = logn  where R is the thermodynamic gas constant, T, the absolute temperature, z, the valence of the ion, and F is the Faraday measure of the electrical charge in one mole of ions of the same valence as X.  If the membrane of a typical neuron was permeable only to one species of ion, if it resembled in other significant respects the ideal cell the Nernst equation faithfully describes, and if its resting potential was identical to the equilibrium potential for the ion to which its membrane is permeable, then its membrane potential would be due just to the factors which determine the ratio of extracellular to intracellular concentrations of the relevant ion.  But real neurons aren’t like that, and their membrane potentials differ from what they should be according to the Nernst equation.  Thus whatever the Nernst equation contributes to our understanding of the membrane potential of a real neuron, it does not describe a regularity actually instanced by the membranes of resting neurons, and its explanatory role cannot be that of a Humean covering law.
   So what good is the Nernst equation?  The answer lies in the use to which it was put in studying the facts which explanations of resting and other membrane potentials must take account of.  Discrepancies between the Nernst equilibrium potential for potassium and actual membrane potentials were established experimentally by measuring changes in the magnitudes of resting potentials as more and more potassium was added to the fluid outside of a neuron in an experimental preparation.  To account for the discrepancies, Goldman, Hodgkin, and Katz proposed that membrane potentials varied with distribution of chlorine and sodium, as well as potassium ions.  Assuming that no ions traverse the membrane of a resting cell, and therefore that the cross membrane voltage gradient is perfectly stable, the Nernst equation suggests that if the membrane were equally permeable to all of these ions, the membrane potential should be proportional to the log of ([K]out/[K]in + [Na]out/[Na]in + [Cl]in/[Cl]out.​[8]​  But because the permeabilities differ, different electrical potentials are required to maintain equilibrium for different species of ions.  To take account of this, Goldman, Hodgkin, and Katz weighted the concentration ratios by multiplying each one by a different permeability ratio (pK for potassium, PNa for sodium, etc.) to obtain the equation
	3.	Constant Field Equation:​[9]​ Vm = 58 log .​[10]​
This equation tells us--for an imaginary cell in which the resting potential is an equilibrium potential which varies with no factors other than K, Na, and Cl  concentrations and the membrane permeabilities to these ions--what the cross membrane ion concentration ratios would have to be to maintain Vm at close to the value calculated from measurements of real resting potentials.  Notice, however, that although the Constant Field Equation is more faithful to real membrane potentials than the Nernst equation, it correctly describes Vm only for imaginary cells whose cross membrane voltage gradients are uniform, and whose membrane potentials vary only with the factors the equation mentions.  Real neurons don’t work that way either-- especially because potassium and sodium leak through the membrane while the cell is at rest.  Thus even though it describes membrane potentials more accurately than the Nernst equation, exceptions to the constant field equation are the rule rather than the exception, and so it cannot be a Humean law.
   Mullins and Noda provided a still more accurate description by dropping the assumption that Vm is an equilibrium potential and taking potassium and sodium leakage into consideration.  They suppose that at rest, the membrane potential is maintained in a steady state by a mechanism which actively moves sodium and potassium across the membrane as required to compensate for the leakage due to membrane permeability .  Accordingly, Mullins’ and Noda’s Steady State equation weights the cross membrane ion concentration ratios by a cross membrane transport, as well as permeability constants.  Ignoring chlorine, their equation can be written
	4.	Vm =58 log .  Here, r is the ratio of active sodium to potassium transport which corrects for leakage, and b is the ratio of sodium to potassium permeability which allows leakage.
   Solutions of the Steady State Equation approximate to real resting potential magnitudes if r is written 3Na out/2 K in.  So written, the Steady State equation is a contingent generalization which holds only on average.  It does not explain the resting potential, and would not do so even if it delivered even better approximations of the real quantities.  Instead, by describing relations which obtain between membrane potential, and transport, permeability, and concentration ratios, the equation sets out facts to be explained, and places constraints on their explanation.  For example, according to 4., an adequate explanation of the resting potential must tell us what factors account for sodium and potassium transport, how they do their work, and why they operate in such a way that on average, two potassium ions enter the cell for every 3 sodium ions which flow out.  The standard explanations posit, and describe the structure and behavior of a complex protein located in the membrane which pumps sodium out and potassium in through the membrane.  Various schemes have been suggested for the operation of this Na-K pump.  All of them propose that the pump has sites which bind and release sodium and potassium ions to pump them in and out of the neuron.  All of them describe the pump as operating in such a way that that its sodium and binding sites are exposed in alternation 
…(presumably within a channel like structure) to the extracellular and intracellular solutions.  The cyclic conformational changes are driven by phosphorylation and dephosphorylation of the protein and are accompanied by changes in binding affinity for the two ions.  Thus sodium is bound during intracellular exposure of the sites and subsequently released to the extracellular solution; potassium is bound during extracellular exposure and released to the cytoplasm.(Nicholls et al, pp. 82-3)

The energy the protein requires to transport the ions is provided by ATP hydrolysis.(p.81)​[11]​  Contrary to the Humeans, this aspect of the resting potential is explained by describing the Na-K pump and saying what its various parts do to help maintain the resting potential, rather than by subsuming events under universally applicable, exceptionless, non-contingent laws. 
   The pump operates in a highly regular way.  In addition to the fact that	
	5.	‘[a]n average of three sodium and two potassium ions are bound to the Na-K pump for 
		each molecule of ATP hydrolyzed’(Nicholls et al, p.82), 
we are told, for example, that the pump’s binding affinity changes in a regular way with the position of the binding sites in such a way that sodium is bound inside the membrane, and released outside of it, while potassium is bound outside and released inside the membrane.  Conforming as it does to limited regularities like these the pump contributes to the maintenance of the resting potential in accordance with the Steady State equation, and to lessor degrees, with the Constant Field and Nernst equations.  Generalizations like 5. set out details an adequate explanation must account for.  In so doing, they like, the Nernst, Steady State, and Field equations constrain explanations and help guide investigations.  Finally, the regularities they describe are also significant because as long as they obtain, the Na-K pump will operate in the same way, and its components will behave in the same ways to make the same contributions to the resting potential.  As long as this continues to be the case the same explanation will account adequately for the facts of interest about the resting potential.
   Without going into the details we have no space for, roughly the same thing can be said about the explanation of the action potential.  Recall that at rest, the charge just inside a neuron’s membrane is negative relative to the change just outside the membrane.   Hodgkin and Katz found that when they increased the concentration of sodium outside of the membrane, enough sodium flowed in to depolarize it, and that an action potential developed when the depolarization reached a certain level.  They found also that at the peak of the action potential, the membrane potential varies with the extracellular sodium concentration.  Using the Constant Field equation, they calculated that the measured variation in the membrane potential is roughly what it should be if the membrane becomes more permeable to sodium by a factor or roughly 500.  This application of the Constant Field equation does not tell us what causes the action potential, any more than the bullets in a murder victim’s body tell detectives who murdered her.  Instead, just as the detectives can apply ballistics methods to the bullets to find out what kind of gun the murderer used,, the investigators used the Constant Field equation to figure out that the action potential was initiated by a causal influence which increased the membrane’s sodium permeability.  And the equation constrained the explanation of the action potential by indicating how great a change in sodium permeability an adequate explanation would have to account for. (*Nicholls et al p.91)  The detectives learn they should look for a suspect who possessed a certain kind of gun, the investigators learned that they should look for a sodium channel which opens with depolarization.    
   Action potentials can be initiated experimentally by artificially depolarizing a very small stretch of membrane to produce a sodium influx which produces an electrical current just inside the depolarized membrane.  But what maintains the current at the same level as it traverses the axon?  Why isn’t it diminished, by sodium leakage, interference from transient local currents, and so on?  It was found that a bit of membrane a little further down the axon is depolarized to threshold level by sodium ions moved downstream by mutual electrical repulsion from the place they entered.  When this happens, more sodium flows into the cell through the newly depolarized membrane.  When a bit of membrane downstream from there reaches threshold depolarization, a new sodium influx occurs. And so on. This enables the current to travel down the neuron in the form of a wave without loss of amplitude.  The sodium influxes involved in this process are explained as due to operation of a series of voltage gated sodium channels.  The channel is thought to be a protein structure with components which can shift back and forth under the influence of changes in membrane potential between a configuration which decreases, and a configuration which increases sodium permeability.​[12]​  A complete explanation would include a detailed account of the molecular structure and the operation of this gate.​[13]​ One of the things the account would have to tell us is why the channel opens with depolarization and closes with hyperpolarization.  Investigators have begun to describe the structure of the protein which constitutes the channel, and have proposed a model for the configurations and configuration shifts of the positively charged components involved in permeability changes. One of the facts they must take account of is that the process is stochastic; threshold membrane depolarization greatly raises the probability that a channel will open, but does not deterministically guarantee that it will. (Nichols et al. p.31,93).  
   Our final example is Ohm’s law which says that I(current flow between two points) =V(voltage)/R(resistance).  It is used to describe the electrical current in an ideal circuit used to model features of the electrical activity in a neuron.  The current due to the flow of ions of any given species, X, (iX) varies with a driving potential equal to Vm-EK (the difference between the membrane potential and the ion’s equilibrium potential) and conductance, gX.  gX is the reciprocal of resistance.  The magnitude of gX varies with, but is not identical to membrane permeability to the ion.  Thus for sodium, Ohm’s law can be rewritten as iNa = gNa (Vm – ENa), and the current due to the flow of ions of more than one kind can be calculated from their conductances and driving potentials.(Levitan and Kaczmarek p.94)   Like Nernst’s equation, the Constant Field equation, and the Steady State equation, Ohm’s law is a description used to draw conclusions about causal influences and derive constraints on causal explanations of neuronal electrical activity.(*cites)  Like the others, it is more faithful  to an idealized model than a real system.  Like the others, it is not used (and would not be suitable for use) as a covering law in a Deductive Nomological explanation of membrane potentials, or neuronal electrical currents.  Thus the equations which seemed to have the best chance to qualify as laws describing Humean regularities turn out to have different features and to fill different roles than Humean laws.  
   We saw that our explanations also involved some limited, contingent generalizations.  One was 5.  Another was
	6.	If the negative cross membrane voltage at one point of the membrane becomes less 
		negative until it reaches a critical threshold (of *mV in a squid axon) a nearby sodium 
		channel downstream will most probably open downstream.  
	According to SD, at least some generalizations like these should be understood, on analogy to 1.1 and 1.2 above as describing regularities among causal factors and their effects by virtue of which certain counterfactuals of the form I  R are true where the I are ideal interventions and the R are results.  Thus if depolarization influences sodium channels as described, it should be counterfactually the case (according to SD) that if membrane potentials are depolarized to the required threshold by ideal interventions, then the probability that sodium channels open downstream should vary in accordance with 6.  And since channel openings don’t cause depolarizations upstream, it should be counterfactually the case that the voltage across one bit of the membrane does not change in a regular way with ideal interventions on downstream sodium channels.  Similarly, 5. should describe a counterfactual regularity among ideal interventions which hydrolyze ATP and bindings of sodium and potassium ions.  And since the average 3/2 sodium to potassium binding ratio does not cause ATP hydrolysis, it should be counterfactually the case that ATP hydrolysis in the pump does not result from ideal interventions (if such were possible) which directly bind sodium and potassium to the pump in a ratio of 3 to 2. without doing anything which could independently cause  ATP hydrolysis independently of the intervention.
   5. and 6 are examples of generalizations arrived at by reasoning from the results of  experimental manipulations.  Involving as it does the study of what happens to one item when one wiggles another, the importance of this kind of research is one of the things which makes SD seem plausible.  But the construal of such generalizations as describing counterfactual invariances involving ideal interventions is complicated by the fact that ideal interventions are not always achievable in  actual experimental practice.  Often it is impossible or impracticable to manipulate the factor of interest, and the only way to study its causal influence is by thinking about what happens when experimentalists manipulate other factors they can get a handle on.​[14]​  Furthermore, to qualify as an ideal intervention on X with respect to Y, a manipulation must meet two conditions which are often hard to satisfy. We mentioned the first requirement in connection with the diphtheria toxin example. In wiggling one item to see what effect it has on another, one had better not wiggle anything else that could independently produce the effect of interest. This gives rise to the requirement of
	7.	Immaculate Manipulation: An intervention on X with respect to Y must change  the value of 
		X in such a way that if the value of Y changes, it does so only because of the change the 
		manipulation produced in X. (Woodward  *‘Explanation and Invariance in the Special 
		Sciences’ Draft 10/20/97 p.2)   
This assumes that if X influences the values of Y, it does so as part of a system (which may consist of nothing more than X and Y) which meets a modularity condition:
	8.	Modularity: The parts of the system to which X and Y belong operate independently 
		enough to allow an exogenous cause to change the values of X without producing 
		changes in other parts of the system which can influence the value of Y independently of 
		the manipulation of X.(*cite)	 
   Actual experimental practice fails to satisfy these conditions in so many cases that it is more natural to treat generalizations like 5. and 6. as descriptions of actual features of real world systems than as counterfactual invariances involving ideal interventions.  We can get an idea of what this amounts by comparing the generalizations to a frequentative claim about a bus route: ‘The #500 bus doglegs at East Liberty and returns to Highland via Penn Ave, on its way from Stanton to 5th Avenue’. We can decide whether the frequentative is true by observing the bus a few times, or consulting route records, and checking to make sure the route has not been officially changed.  We can argue for it by inferences based on regulations and practices of the Pittsburgh Port Authority.  We may be ingenious enough to argue for it from information about what routes are available, what the road conditions are like, how fast the bus can go, and how long it usually takes it to get to 5th Ave. The frequentative describes what the #500 bus typically does to get from Stanton to 5th Ave.  Because it is a frequentative, it can be true even if the conditional prediction ‘If the #500 bus goes from Stanton Ave. to 5th Ave. tomorrow it will dogleg at East Liberty, and return to Highland on Penn Ave.’ turns out to be false.  Nor does its truth depend on the truth of counterfactuals about what route the bus would have taken if it had gone to 5th Ave. at times when in fact it was not running.  If the frequentative is true, that is a reason to expect that if the antecedent of the prediction turns out to be true, so will its consequent, but how good a reason it is depends upon whether they are ever allowed to take a different route, how many alternatives (if any) are available, how often emergencies make sure the standard route impracticable, and so on.  The frequentative also supports retrodictions about how the bus got to 5th Avenue in the past, but how well it supports them depends on similar factors. Unlike the frequentative, the counterfactual, is not descriptive of what the bus typically does at present.  Unlike the prediction whose antecedent will come true if the bus goes to 5th Ave. tomorrow, nothing can happen to make its antecedent true.  We discuss such counterfactuals in §n.  A last thing to note about the frequentative is that taken together with background knowledge that a bus which crosses Penn Ave on Highland without the dogleg is likely to be jammed in traffic, it tells us one thing we need to know in order to understand how the bus gets to its destination in a timely fashion.  
   As the Mechanist understands them, generalizations like 5. and 6. are analogous in some respects to the frequentative description of the bus route.  Rather than describing counterfactual regularities among ideal interventions and their results, they are partial descriptions of the modus operandi of neuronal mechanisms.  They support predictions and retrodictions whose truth is not required for their truth.  As with the description of the bus route, the reliability of predictions and retrodictions based on such generalizations varies with the stability of the systems they describe and the settings in which they operate.  And like the description of the bus route, 5. and 6. deliver information we need to understand, and to investigate further how the system they describe produces effects of interest.  Finally, just as the description of the bus route raises the question why the route includes a dogleg, 5. and 6. set out facts which require further explanation.  An adequate explanation of the resting potential would have to tell us how the Na-K pump maintains the transport ration which 6 describes.  An adequate explanation of the action potential would have to describe the causal factors and activities which open the sodium in accordance with 6.  If depolarization itself influences a sodium channel how does it accomplish this, and why must it reach the critical threshold in order to do so?  If the channel is opened by something that causes, or accompanies, or is caused by depolarization, what is it, and how does it operate?
	iv.		We do not believe SD provides a satisfactory alternative to the Mechanist account of causal explanation.  Before setting out our main reasons for thinking this, we note that even if counterfactual invariance was as important to causality as SD takes it to be, this would not diminish the importance of activities to causal processes and our understanding of them.
   Humeanism thrives on superstitious fears about notions of causal influence which cannot be reduced to regularities, and the suspicious belief that notions of actual and counterfactual regularity are easier to understand or better grounded empirically.  These superstitions make it natural to think that as far as causality goes, there’s nothing special about activities.  The idea is that if regularities make the difference between  causally productive and other relations, it shouldn’t matter whether they involve activities.  Since ideal interventions are causal processes, SD cannot completely satisfy a Humean.  But it promises the next best thing; the notion that X exerts a causal influence need not figure in descriptions of the counterfactual invariances between values of X and Y on which SD bases its account of causally productive relations between the two.  And even if there are some cases in which the relevant interventions would bring X from inactivity to activity, counterfactual regularities involving activities should be no more characteristic of causality than regularities which do not.  Thus SD seems to downplay the importance of activities as much as a Humean analysis.  But activities are important.  We don’t think that actual or counterfactual regularities are essential to causality, or that all causes operate with great regularity.  But where regularities are to be found they tend to obtain among effects and the activities which produce them.
   For example ‘H. pylori causes almost all peptic ulcers, accounting for 80 percent of stomach ulcers and more than 90 percent of duodenal ulcers.’  The bug does its work by weakening  
…the protective mucous coating of the stomach and duodenum, which allows acid to get through to the sensitive lining beneath. Both the acid and the bacteria irritate the lining and cause a sore, or ulcer. H. pylori is able to survive in stomach acid because it secretes enzymes that neutralize the acid. This mechanism allows H. pylori to make its way to the "safe" area -- the protective mucous lining. Once there, the bacterium's spiral shape helps it burrow through the mucous lining. (http://healthlink.mcw.edu/article/956711536.html (​http:​/​​/​healthlink.mcw.edu​/​article​/​956711536.html​) ) 

But 
Researchers recently discovered that H. pylori infection is common in the United States: about 20 percent of people under 40 and half of people over 60 are infected with it. Most infected people, however, do not develop ulcers. Why H. pylori doesn't cause ulcers in every infected person is unknown. Most likely, infection depends on characteristics of the infected person….(ibid)

Thus, although H pylori bugs cause ulcers as parts of a mechanism whose workings we can expect to understand, ulcers do not regularly accompany H pylori infection.  There is no actually or counterfactually regular relation between the occurrence of ulcers and changes in the number, the position, or any other features of the bacteria which are not activities.  We have no reason to accept counterfactual claims about what would happen to someone if a H. pylori bugs were introduced into his system by a manipulation which did not make them engage in the activities required for the production of ulcers.  
   If actual or counterfactual regularities obtain, they obtain between occurrences of ulcers and the things the bacteria do to weaken and burrow through the protective mucous coating to the sensitive lining beneath, the bacteria’s secretion of the enzymes which neutralize stomach acid, and so on. Bacteria in different numbers and somewhat different positions may perform the same burrowing and excreting activities.  Depending on the condition of the digestive organ environment, different activities may be carried out by H Pylori in the same spatial configurations, concentrations, etc.  In general the activities of the bacteria which correlate well with ulcer production do not map systematically onto conditions other than activities (location of the bacteria, their concentration in a given area, their movements, chemical makeup, physical structure, size, and so on.)  Thus it is to be expected that the regularities which obtain between occurrences of ulcers and the activities of the parts of the mechanism which produces and sustains them will not obtain between ulcers and values other than the ulcer producing activities of the bacteria and the rest of the mechanism to which they belong.  The same sorts of disconnections between effects and values other than activities of their causes are typical of systems which produce their effects in a regular way. Thus, even if counterfactual invariances were essential to causality, the invariances would involve the activities of causal factors.
	   v.	Humeans cannot account for explanations of the irregularly produced effects of unreliable mechanisms.  To the extent that its account of causality requires similar interventions to produce similar results, SD fares no better.  And some  perfectly good causal explanations explain effects by showing how they result from the workings of unreliable mechanisms or sub-mechanisms which produce their effects irregularly and infrequently.  Such systems do not exhibit the counterfactual invariances SD requires. Chaotic effects illustrate this difficulty.  A chaotic effect is almost, if not completely, determined​[15]​ by the initial conditions of a system which is highly sensitive to differences in initial conditions.  The relevant differences are so small that it is practically, if not theoretically impossible for investigators to discriminate among them either by observation or by experimental manipulation.  If the system which produces an effect is fully chaotic, the results of its operation will be a-periodic, and observationally indistinguishable from genuinely random results produced by a non-deterministic system.(*cite Lorenz)        
   For example, Kaplan, et al recorded trans-membrane potentials of giant squid axons to see how they would change in response to periodic electrical stimulation.  Each stimulus lasted 1 ms and had a magnitude of .6mA.  It was clear that the stimuli could (and often did) produce responses in the electrical activity of the axon by raising its magnitude in comparison to a pre-established threshold.  Action potential spikes (AP) exceeded the threshold.  Subthreshold (ST) responses fell well below the threshold but were measurably above resting levels.  The response patterns Kaplan et al observed differed with the rate at which stimuli were administered.  Regular responses occurred when pulses were administered at intervals of 51ms (one AP, occurred for each stimulus pulse), 26 ms (one AP occurred for every 2 pulses), 17 ms (1 AP for every three pulses).  Regularly occurring  ST were observed for pulse intervals of 26 ms and 17 ms.  Presumably, the electrical pulses cause the APs.  So far, this is congenial to SD.  Even though each of the stimulus frequencies just mentioned has its own pulse/AP ratio, it is plausible that counterfactually invariant relations hold at each frequency.  Regularities also obtain among pulses and STs at 26ms and 17 ms frequencies.  But the response patterns become irregular as pulses are administered more frequently.  Unevenly spaced, aperiodic APs and STs were detected at intervals between 16 ms and 12. ms. And at 11.8, the STs began to occur aperiodically.  Kaplan et al take the irregular AP responses to be associated with ‘deterministic subthreshold chaos’ which ‘can be identified as such only if the subthreshold events that occur between suprathreshold activity are…analyzed.’ (Kaplan et al [1996] p. 4074 *DT Kaplan, JR Clay, T Manning, L Glass, MR Guevara, A Shrier, Physical Review Letters,  Vol. 76, No. 21, The American Physical Society, pp.4074—4077>>.  If they are right, then when stimuli are administered, say every 12 ms, each AP is caused by one, or a sequence of n pulses.  But it need not be the case that the next pulse, or the next n pulses will produce an AP.  And there will be no way to evaluate counterfactual claims about what would have happened if an axon had been stimulated at a slightly different time than it was.  We don’t think this means the observably or experimentally discriminable electrical pulses exerted no causal influence on the production of APs or STs.  If the system is chaotic, invariant relations might hold between APs and STs and quantities which cannot be distinguished from one another by actual (non-ideal)  measurements or experimental manipulations.  But these quantities are not to be confused with the pulses which can be experimentally controlled and distinguished from one another.  The latter cause ST and AP responses, but do not produce them in anything like a regular way when they are administered every 12 ms. 
	vi.	A counterfactual conditional is true whenever things are such that if its antecedent were true, had been true in the past, or will be true in the future, so would its consequent.  It is false whenever things are such that if the antecedent were (had been, will be) true, its consequent would be (would have been, will be) false.  Whenever there is no fact of the matter as to what would happen (would have happened, will happen) if the antecedent were (had been, will be) true, the counterfactual has no truth value.  For example, suppose that now, at t1, you predict that	
	9.	if it there is a sea battle at t2 (at some specified time after t1)  then the officers’ ball 
		scheduled that day will be cancelled.
The antecedent of 9. is not true whenever things are such that that there will be no sea battle t2, or things are up in the air with regard to whether there will be.  We will say that 9. is unrealized at every such time, and similarly for all other counterfactuals.  Some conditionals which are unrealized at one time become realized at another.  If the sea battle occurs at t2 9. is realized at t2 and every subsequent time.  If something happens at any time before t2 to make the sea battle inevitable, 9. is realized from that time on.​[16]​  If there is no sea battle at  t2, 9. is never realized.  Some conditionals are not only unrealized, but unrealizable.  The counterfactual conditional ‘if 2 were greater than 4, then 2 would be greater than 3’ is an example.  Some conditionals are never realized even though there are times at which they could have been.  Thus even though something could have happened during the 1948 election to make its antecedent true, the counterfactual conditional, ‘(Harry Truman lost the 1948 election)  (Harry Truman is not President in 1949)’ turns out never to be realized.  Some never to be realized conditionals have truth values by virtue of logical, mathematical, and other principles (taken together, in some cases with matters of contingent fact).  ‘(pi = 3.7)  (circles have bigger areas than they’ve been telling you)’ is an example.  
   SD must assume that  never to be realized counterfactual conditionals about interventions and their results have truth values.  This assumption is problematical.  It counts in favor of Mechanism that it need not assume it.  Recall that according to Woodward, if one item, X, exerts a causal influence on another, Y, then
	10.	Invariance: the values of Y vary in a regular way with at least some ideal interventions 
		consisting of manipulations of the value of X,   
The interventions must be performed on systems which satisfy the Modularity requirement (8), and must qualify as Immaculate (7.) to ensure that if the value of Y changes, the change will be due exclusively to the change the intervention makes in the value of X.
  Interventions meeting these conditions are commonly represented by assigning values to variables in directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) which meet Judea Pearl’s, Peter Spirtes’, Clark Glymour’s, and Richard Scheiness’ conditions for causal Bayesian networks.(*cite Causality pp 23—24, SGS…).  Ignoring details,​[17]​ these graphs consist of nodes connected by lines and arrows  arranged to represent probabilistic relations between factors belonging to real causal systems.  Each node is a variable representing a different part of the causal system of interest.  The arrows represent probabilistic relations among values of variables such that the variable at the tail of an arrow screens off the variable at its point.  The construction and use of a DAG are constrained by probabilistic relations of independence and dependence between various factors exhibited by the data from the system of interest.  They are also constrained by various assumptions about that system​[18]​.  They employ algorithms which determine, among other things, what if any impact the assignment of a new value to one of the variables in the graph would have on the assignments of values to other variables in the graph.  And there are theorems to determine the scope and limits of the algorithms.  If variables X and Y represent parts X and Y of a real system, an ideal intervention on X with respect to Y is represented by assigning a new value to X without changing the value of any variables except those at the heads of arrows leading back to X.​[19]​.  When a new value is assigned to X, the algorithms, etc., are used to determine .(—in conformity with the probability distributions over the data) what changes (if any) to make in the assignments of values to Y and any nodes connected by arrows running between them.  
   But nodes in graphs are not to be confused with the parts of the systems they represent.  Furthermore  DAGs  typically represent  simplified and idealized version of the real system to which X and Y actually belong.  If there are non-negligible discrepancies between the real and the idealized or simplified system, we can’t conclude straightway from a graph just what would happen in the real system if X were actually manipulated.  Thus the fact that Y must be assigned a value of such and such if X is assigned a value of so and so need not be sufficient to determine the truth value of a prediction about what will result from an actual manipulation.  This is most obvious where the real system fails to meet one or more of the conditions (see n. 18) assumed to hold in constructing and using the DAG.​[20]​  Furthermore, we will argue that if ‘I  R’ is a never to be realized counterfactual which claims that the value of a real item, Y, would change as described by R if an ideal intervention, I, were performed on a real item ,X, it does not follow from the fact that we can tell what value to assign to Y in a DAG that there is any answer to the question whether ‘I  R’ is true or false. 
   Some effects are caused by, and must be explained in terms of, factors which humans lack the strength, the understanding, the resources or the willingness, moral courage, or moral callousness to manipulate.  Accordingly Woodward understands ideal interventions non-anthropomorphically without essential reference to notions like human agency.(*p.6).  When humans cannot or will not intervene in natural systems, nature may do the job for them.  But in some systems, the factors involved in the production of the effect to be explained are so entangled that (8) the Modularity requirement is violated and immaculate manipulations cannot be accomplished.  For example (attributed by Woodward and Hausman to Eliot Sober) consider
 the claim that the gravitational force exerted by one massive body causes some effect (such as tides) on a second.  It is possible that any physically possible process that would change the force exerted by the first on the second (by changing the position of the first) would require a change in the position of some third body and this would in turn exert a direct effect on the second in violation of one of the conditions for intervention. (Woodward and Hausman ([1999] n 12, p.537) 

The nervous system is one of many biological systems which provide further examples.​[21]​  In at least some of these cases causal factors can be identified, and the results of their influences ascertained even though ideal interventions cannot occur, and counterfactuals whose antecedents describe them are never realized.  
   Nuel Belnap has argued that predictions about the results of non-deterministic causal processes have no truth values until what they predict either happens or fails to happen.(*cite) We believe that similar arguments can be applied to counterfactual conditionals to show that never to be realized counterfactual conditionals about non-deterministic systems have no truth values.  If this is correct, only deterministic systems can satisfy the Invariance condition (10). 
It is to Mechanism’s credit that it does not appeal to counterfactual regularities in a way which limits its application to deterministic systems. 
   Where t0, is an interval of past time just big enough for the occurrence of an immaculate intervention, I, on X, t1 is a later interval just big enough for R, a specified change in the value of Y, and  t2 is any interval of time of any size after t1, consider the claim
	11.	It is the case at t2 that I at t0 R at t1,.  
Whether or not the intervention could have occurred at t0, 11. if it did not occur, 11. is unrealized at all times because nothing which happens after t0 to change the past as required to bring it about that the intervention did occur then.  To see why 11. has no truth value if X and Y belong to a non-deterministic system, consider Fig 1, a diagram we adapted from Nuel Belnap’s and Mitchell Green’s treatment of predictions.​[22]​
                                                                    Fig. 1

The parallel lines in this diagram are time lines representing intervals to, t1, t2, and so on.  Let a moment be everything that is actually going on at every place during any single temporal interval.​[23]​  Each interval up to and including the present contains exactly one actual moment.  For the actual moment whose members are actually going on during any given interval, ti, there are any number of mutually incompatible moments, each one of which includes one or more things which could be, but are not going on during ti.  A non-actual, possible moment may contain one or more actual happenings, but at least one of its components must be merely possible; only actual moments contain exclusively actual components.  A history is 
…a maximal chain of moments, a complete possible course of [causally related] events stretching all the way back [into the past] and all the way forward [beyond the present].(Thin Red Line, p.139) ​[24]​
In our diagram, histories are represented by ascending lines.  A segment of a history (actual or possible) is a part consisting of one or more connected moments.  Ha is a segment of the history whose moments are all actual up to the present (t2).  It’s components include actual moments from t2, t1, t0, and before.  Assuming non-determinism, we can suppose that a number of possible segments (perhaps infinitely many) branch off of HA before t2 in addition to the segment whose moments turned out to be actual.  The non-bold lines branching from Ha before t2 indicate a very few of them..  Even if one of these segments contained more  highly probable happenings than the others, there is not at t2 a fact of the matter as to which possible continuation will be actual. A number of possible, but non actual history segments which branch off of HA at t0.  A number of others, like H9, extend from t0 back into the past, but do not do not share any moments with HA.  Some possible but non-actual history segments (e.g., H7, H8 ) include I at t0 and R at t1 relative to these, 11. is true and SD can consider X to be causally productive of R. In others, (e.g., H5, H6) I occurs at t0 and R does not occur at t1.  Relative to these 11. is false, and according to SD, X is not causally productive of R.  But there is no fact of the matter at t2 whether, if I had actually occurred at t1 it would have belonged to a segment in which R occurred at t1.  Unless there is some reason why 11. should be true by virtue of possibilities like H7 and H8, instead of false by virtue of possibilities like H5 and H6, 11 has no truth value.  We submit there is not, and that any choice of an I at t0 with which to assign a truth value would be arbitrary.​[25]​ , ​[26]​ 
   This might not seem to be an unwelcome result for SD.  Why not understand non-deterministic causal influences in terms of probabilistic invariances?  We suppose this would involve never to be realized counterfactuals according to which the probabilities of effects involving specific changes in the values of Y vary in a regular way with at least some ideal interventions on a causal influence, X.  As we understand it, probabilistic invariances would depend upon the truth of claims of the form P(R at t1 |I at t0) =n which assign a value of n to the probability of R at t1 conditional on I at t0.​[27]​  It is hard to see how such claims can have truth values.  Let S​1, S2……be different segments of possible histories.  Let each segment extend back from t0 to some time before t0, and let each segment include I at t0.  A number of different possible continuations will branch off of each of the Si at t0.  Some of the continuations of any given segment will include R at t1, but others will not.  Neither we nor Woodward believe that the obtaining or non-obtaining of causally productive relations depends upon assignments of subjective probability.  Thus if X exerts a causal influence on the probability of Y’s assuming some value, the probability of R at t1 conditional on I at t0 must be an objective probability whose values do not depend upon any real or ideal agent’s betting habits, strengths of the beliefs, etc.  The only way we can understand values of n as measurements of objective, rather than subjective probabilities of R at t1  conditional on I at t0 is to think of them as functions of how many continuations of segments including I at t0 do, and how many do not include R at t1.  We might suppose, for example, that if S1 is a segment with I at t0, and R at t1 in one third of its continuations,  then P(R at t1 |I at t0 = .333 relative to S1.  If S2 is a segment with I at t0 and R at t1 in half of its continuations, then P(R at t1 |I at t0 = .5 relative to S2.  And so on.  See Fig. 2 below.  It may happen that different segments with I at t0 branch off into continuations with different proportions of occurrences to non occurrences of R at t1. Then P(R at t1 |I at t0) will have different values relative to different segments of these possible histories.  Thus some segments which contain I at t0 will have continuations which satisfy a counterfactual claim about how the probability of R at t1 is related to I at t0  and others will not.     As long as this is possible, the supposition that unrealized counterfactuals about ideal interventions and their results have truth values faces the same difficulties as the supposition that non-probabilistic counterfactuals like ‘I at t0  R at t1’ have truth values.   Someone might suggest that the probability of R at t1 conditional on I at t0 is a function of the total number of possible histories including both the intervention and the result and the total number of possible histories which include the intervention, without the result.  But if this assumes that all of the I at t0 histories should be equally weighted in calculating P(R at t1|I at t0), we see no reason for weighting them this way.  And if it assumes weighting different histories differently, we know of no principled way to assign the weights
.   
                                                                      Fig. 2. 
   
   Suppose things have transpired in the actual history of the world at some time, t-1, before t0 to make the I impossible at t0 because the system X and Y belong to did not evolve in a form which satisfies the Modularity condition (8.) or because no causes available at t0 can immaculately manipulate X with respect to Y. Then I can and does occur at t0 only in segments in which the system to which X and Y belong, or the environment in which that system functions, differs significantly from their counterparts in HA.  This complicates the assignment of probabilities considerably.  Furthermore if we want to know whether X exerts a causal influence on the probabilities of specified values of Y, what we’re interested in is what X actually did, actually does, or will actually do to Y.  Many of the segments of possible histories in which I occurs at t0 will be too exotic for us to learn much about that from how many of their continuations do, and how many do not contain R at t1.
	vii.	Recall Sober’s example in which a tidal effect was explained as due to a factor which could not be immaculately manipulated.  Woodward and Hausman responded that despite its impossibility, the laws of physics might determine what the ideal intervention could accomplish. (*Cite)  As this suggests, SD’s best hope for truth values for never to be realized counterfactuals might be to embrace determinism and assume that for every good causal explanation, there are laws available to decide what would have happened if the relevant ideal intervention had been accomplished.  But then SD collapses into a form of Humeanism according to which there are laws to determine not just how the actual history of the world will continue into the future, as well as the developments of alternative possible histories.  This is not a happy option.  A main reason for wanting an alternative to Humeanism was that at least with regard to biology and other special sciences there are good empirical reasons to doubt whether such laws are can be found in connection with every good causal explanation.  Furthermore, to the extent that it assumes the existence of laws to evaluate never to be realized counterfactuals, SD burdens itself with long standing, vexed questions about how we can tell which generalizations are true, exceptionless and blessed with the modal status and the other virtues of genuine laws.  It is to Mechanism’s credit that although it raises epistemological questions, these are not among them.
   DAGs can sometimes be used without invoking Humean laws to evaluate never to be realized counterfactuals about the results of ideal interventions.  The most favorable cases for their use are those in which the distribution of observed quantities in a body of data satisfies all of the conditions (see n.18) required for the construction of an optimal representation of a causal system.  When this happens, calculations of how the value of one variable in a DAG are to be adjusted when new values are assigned to another can be sufficient to determine truth value of a never to be realized counterfactual about an ideal intervention on the system the DAG represents—even if the intervention requires a manipulation which neither man nor nature can achieve.(But see n.17).  But Glymour, Spirtes, and Scheiness and are the first to admit that many bodies of data fail to meet one or more of their conditions.​[28]​ This places limitations on how much a DAG can tell us.  How serious they are depends on which conditions are unsatisfied, and which ideal interventions are of interest.  We assume that at least some troublesome bodies of data arise from systems which produce effects whose causes we nevertheless can understand quite well.  Thus if SD relied on the ability of DAG techniques to establish the truth values of never to be realized counterfactuals about ideal interventions on real systems, it would incur the same epistemological burdens which non-ideal bodies of data place upon Glymour, Spirtes, and Scheiness.  It is to Mechanisms advantage that these are not its burdens.​[29]​  .
   The most pressing epistemological questions raised by Mechanism are the following.
	a]	How do we know what activities the parts of a mechanism engages in?  For example, how we can know that the Na-K pump transports sodium out of the neuron and potassium in, or that sodium channels open and close or that H pylori weakens the mucous coating which protects the stomach lining, or that it burrows into the lining, and excretes an acid neutralizing substance? 
	b]	How do we find out about the manner in which the relevant activities are carried out?  For example, how do we know that on average the Na-K pump removes 3 Na ions for every 2 K ions it admits into the cell, and that it accomplishes this in part through changes in its configurations? This, like a], is a special case of the question how we know whether a frequentative  is true.
	c]	How do we know what contributions the activities of a part make to the production of the effect of interest?  For example, how do we know that the Na-K pump helps maintain the resting potential by admitting and expelling positively charged ions to compensate for small depolarizations due to leakage; that by opening, the sodium channel admits enough positively charged ions into the cell to produce or maintain an intracellular current at a fixed magnitude; that the bug’s weakening of the mucous coating contributes to the production of an ulcer by allowing digestive acid to reach membrane to irritate it; and that by exuding an acid neutralizing substance, the bug keeps the acid from destroying it before it can complete its work?   









^1	  Davidson tried to finesse the scarcity of explanatory principles which qualify as laws by suggesting that you can be right to claim that X causes Y even if you don’t know what laws cover them as long as there are laws to be found.(*cite)  But as with the idea that natural laws are true because they include ceteris paribus clauses, it is hard to see the point of Davidson’s suggestion if explanations are supposed to show us that the effects they explain were to have been expected.
^2	  The original passage says the activities and entities produce regular changes from start up to finish conditions.  We deleted ‘regular’ to avoid the suggestion that all mechanisms operate reliably to produce their effects with great regularity.
^3	  MDC claimed that the regularities exhibited by reliable mechanisms ‘support counterfactuals’.(MDC pp.7-8)  This claim requires qualifications for reasons we take up in §vi below. 
^4	  In supposing that causal regularities don’t explain, but require explanation by appeal to the activities of individual entities and collections of entities, the mechanist account harks back to Aristotle’s idea of efficient causes which do their work by exercising their capacities to produce changes in things.(*cites)  It agrees with Anscombe’s idea that rather than signifying a single productive relation which obtains between all causes and their effects, the verb, ‘cause’ is better thought of as a place holder for specific kinds of productive activities rather than the name  (cite*).  It agrees, in spirit at least with Cartwright's vision of causal explanation as turning on the identification and measurement of natural capacities, and her objections to traditional tales of natural laws.(cite*)  
^5	  If m were increased too much, the incline would break.  If is too large, the block will fall off.  If the block were immersed in water, the black would float away.  The inclined plane must not be too far away from the earth.  And so on.
^6	  *note on bottom out/non bottom out activities.
^7	  We have changed Woodward’s example by identifying its hero.
^8	  The last term is an inner to outer rather than an outer to inner ratio because chlorine ions are negatively charged, and their electrical gradients run in a direction opposite to the electrical gradients of sodium and potassium. 
^9	  So called because it assumes an equilibrium such that the cross membrane electrical field is perfectly uniform.
^10	  58 log is the value of RT/zF multiplied by 2.306 to convert the log to base 10.
^11	  cp. Alberts et al, pp.209ff., 512—527,Levitan and Kaczmarek, pp 114-115, Shepherd, pp.74-77, Kandel, et al, pp.86ff.
^12	  For details see Kandell et al 111-134..  
^13	  We are of course ignoring a great deal, including the voltage gated potassium channels which open to allow potassium effluxes which hyperpolarize the membrane to terminate action potentials. 
^14	  *examples re: 5 and 6: *(Alberts et al, p.65-6 and *cite a patch clamp depolarization experiment)
^15	  By ‘almost, if not completely’, we mean there are no significant differences between values of Y produced by the system from identical values of C.    
^16	  *Anscombe on the sea battle.
^17	  One such detail, extremely important in other contexts, is that the algorithms used to construct DAGs from statistical data obtained from a real system often deliver, not a single DAG, but a class of different graphs, each of which represents a somewhat different causal set up capable of producing data which are the same in all relevant respects.(Spirtes & Scheiness in McKim and Turner, p.166)
^18	  For example, the Markov Rule, requires the graph to be so constructed that if ni is the variable at the tail of an arrow, and nj is the variable at its head, ni must screen off nj from every node at the tail of an arrow leading to ni.  If one or more other nodes, nk are at the tails of arrows with ni at their heads, ni must screen nj off from the nk.  And so on.  An important general assumption is that the system of interest produces data in such a way that the probabilistic independencies among its members follow from Markov condition applied to a DAG which represents it so that, e.g., if the graph includes an arrow with X at its head and Y at its tail,  variables, X and Y, the counterparts of these variables in the data obtained from the system of interest are neither independent nor conditionally independent on one another.(Glymour in McKim p.209)  A system which meets this condition is said to be faithful to a DAG which represents it.  To assume that a system is faithful is to assume that ‘whatever independencies occur [in the relevant population] arise not from some incredible coincidence, but rather from [causal] structure.(Scheiness in McKim p.194).  It may (but is not always) assumed that the values of the variables included in the graph do not have any common causes which are not represented in the graph.(Glymour in McKim p.217) 
^19	  An arrow leads back to X if it has X at its tail.  Or if the variable at its head is at the tail of another arrow at its head.  And so on. 
^20	  It is worth noting that Glymour, Spirtes, Scheiness emphatically do not believe that real  systems meet all of the conditions they elaborate.  Indeed, they conceive their project as determining what can be learned from statistical data about systems which meet all of them, what if anything can be learned when one or more of their conditions are not met, and what, if anything, can be done to decide whether a given condition is satisfied by the system which produced the data of interest.(Glymour in McKim, p.210, 217)
^21	  One of them is the human nigrostriatal system which regulates motor outputs through an elaborate arrangement of strongly interconnected inhibitory and excitatory feedback mechanisms.(*Cite Black pp.68ff. *Ira B Black, Information in the Brain, Cambridge, MIT, 1994).  Another is the sea snail sensitization mechanism by which neurotransmitter molecules operating in a presynaptic terminal initiate postsynaptic activity in response to a stimulus, while changing the structures their influence depends upon in such a way that continued stimulation produces increasingly less postsynaptic activity.(Black pp.30-31)  Still others are to be found in sensory processing carried out by larger neuronal structures.(*ex: and cite)
^22	  *cite, disclaim, etc.
^23	  * Moments are thus the ontological counterparts of state descriptions.
^24	  Whose moments, unlike ours, are vanishingly small.
^25	  *note on Lewis and measures of closeness
^26	  Relative to histories which do not contain I at t0, 6. will be vacuously true by virtue of the falsity of its antecedent, but so will ‘I at t0  R at t1.  
^27	  In addition, if changes in the values of Y are not to exert a causal influence on ideal interventions on X, certain claims about the probabilities of the latter conditional on the former will have to be false.  Although we will not discuss this, it raises the same kinds of difficulties as the claims we do discuss.
^28	  For example, there are limits to what their methods can accomplish in some cases where DAGs must be constructed from data generated in part by unmeasured causes, even though there are other such cases in which the counterfactuals about interventions can be evaluated (CPS pp.170ff., Glymour in McKim pp.242, Scheiness in McKim pp.197—99).
^29	  *Note: CPS methods may often be employed (e.g., in experimental design) to investigate questions Mechanism believes must be answered in order to find the causes of real world phenomena.  Accordingly, it grants the epistemic importance of solving the problems raised for CPS by imperfect data.  In saying these are not its problems, we mean that because the Mechanist account of causal relations does not assume that the truth values of never to be realized counterfactuals can be ascertained, its acceptability does not depend upon answers to questions about how much CPS can do when it is applied to non-optimal data.  
